

## crash notes

1] crash can only be understood as a probability, a not yet that will show its ontic determinism oscillating between an event and non-event - a not as is but as is not [the ontic constituent]

crash is not an issue about Heideggerian authenticity or non-authenticity but the fundamental orientation, the crashing of reality and the confrontation of history with its own dissolution as the consequence of humanist extrusions on the plane of pure reason

pre-crash history [for example, a history by forensic mechanomorphism] is enabled by certain set-ups in philosophy which allow for particular realms of knowledge to appear, be speakable, be comprehensible [nb. Badiou sees mathematics as the exception to extruded history]

crash backgrounds can only be accessed, revealed from our foregrounded knowledge - the epistemological condition

crash only begins with the end of a certain way of knowing [cf. Rorty, Lash, Gadamer] and its not so far to push the incommensurability of languages [cf. Quine] into fundamental ontological gaps and fissures when there is more than one species privileged in symbolic discourse [nb. mechanomorphism > Dilthey as applicable to computation]

Kant asks what are the limits of knowledge - what is it possible to know?

Nietzsche and Foucault broke with rampant humanism by replying that knowledge is constituted by its own limits and death/finitude within the human, that the human is mediated by a web of languages and language is the tool of self-observation [observer moment] but of itself it is unstable and an infinitely regressing system [witness the genealogy of ideas and environmental archaeology theory undertakes] that cannot comprehend its own foundation since there is no reverse engineered [ontogenic] input, no instantiation, no beginning - instead language embeds itself against the limit of limitations, the autism of closure [an algerian stutterer], and where crashing spawns clotting and re clotting, revealing its limitations in self regressing spin downs that, with a bastard ontology, push the argot-human into the background as a new array is foregrounded

2] the heat-death of a universe, its times arrow entropic movement of the organized to the chaotic - 2nd law of thermodynamics, the notion of considering Schrodinger's Cat to be only dead, that snow is white because it is white.

Leibniz thought time is linked to causation and that the direction of causation doesn't necessarily follow the direction of time, and rejected Hume's analysis of cause, that "the cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time...[and] the cause must be prior to the effect" [A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.3.15]

3] for Otto Roessler a time reversal in the observer is equivalent to a time reversal in the external world

4] quantum mechanics accepts the existence of parallel situations derived from the idea of superposition, derived itself from the experimental observation of single particle interference, and the quantum equation describes not just these two possibilities, but as soon as the particle interacts with anything else, it also includes all the possible outcomes of the possible interactions - the contagion is universal, anything which interacts properly with a superposition will be in a superposed state

in this contagion universes drift, stacked with the superposition of all their possible outcomes with the superposition of all their probable outcomes, via the sleight of hand from the micro to the macro via the thought-use of a cat, extruding conglomerations of scalar possibilities

5] Parmenides - Plato 370BC: it is impossible to think what is not, and it is impossible for what cannot be thought to be - the great question, Is it or is it not? is therefore equivalent to the question, Can it be thought or not?,

6] Leibniz held that any event is real when there is a sufficient reason for its existence, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, thereby allowing as truths all self-consistent entities, where there is no impossibility or contradiction in conceiving of a world without a sun, and a sun positioned and moving in a very different way to ours so long as a self-consistent (non- contradictory) description of such a world can be made  
DIALOGUE ENTRE THEOPHILE ET POLIDORE, 1679

7] Leibniz's Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles [PII], of which he said that no two different objects can have the same description and that if two objects are indiscernible, with all their properties in common, then there is usually only one object  
the quantum domain might seem to violate PII if quantum states aren't distinguished from experimental events by being seen as within the hermeneutics of quantum theory, embedded within the theory, and not as extra-theoretical entities - the same conceptual drive is made by distinguishing between state attributions and value attributions of any physical system, where the former is an embedded theoretical construct, and dependent on a proper representation of the states - in regarding events to be outside theory, the distinctness properties of quantum particles could be achieved only in a meta-theoretical realm and so PII isn't violated – btw.he uses leaves as a favourite example

Leibniz was close to the many-worlds interpretation - and because Leibniz realized that not all self-consistent things are compatible with all other self-consistent things, so to talk about ontology for him meant to form categories of compossibles, each containing compatible possibilities , so the cat dead and cat alive would be in two non-interacting possible worlds.  
He embedded all this as being all in the mind of God, but that God chooses one possible world to exist over all others: the best of all possible worlds for us to live in  
CONVERSATION SUR LA LIBERTE ET LE DESTIN, 1699-1703

Leibniz resisted the idea of many worlds, and collapsed embraced by the god-programmer, but died muttering like Fassbinders Prof. Vollmer "I know something you don't know and no-one must know or it will mean the end of this world"  
Welt am Draht, Rainer Werner Fassbinder, 1973

8] if all possibilities are equal and actual, assume we have a tape on which we are about to shoot a film. the tape is everything that can be thought of clearly and distinctly, or spoken about - it contains all possible films. for me to shoot my film, i don't shoot the takes that are not part of my film and shoot those which are [all things being equal] - so some possible films are now eliminated from the film forever. if all possible films are included, no takes can be removed and the film remains continuous undifferentiated and unchanging most of us will see the film as differentiated, but only because we are part of the film, as self selecting observers, so we see some of it as outside of us and some of it as part of us - its apparent that its reasonable to us that whats on the tape is on it, and not something else, because a world in which Schrodingers cat dies is incompatible to us with a world in which it lives following the law of contradiction, the foundation of rationalism, which asserts that nothing can at the same time have and not have a certain property -

9] thought experiment 1:

if I could be put in place of Jack the Ripper in such a way that the descriptive structure of the world is left wholly intact - the truth of every proposition about it being unaffected - then I and Jack the Ripper are one and the same but identified by different nouns because I, Jonathan Kemp and Jack the Ripper aren't descriptive nor part of the entity [they are theoretical] ie. I don't have a thing-I or Jonathan Kemp, so we can't apply PII and nor can we use the obvious suggestion that I and Jack the Ripper can be located in differing space time zones because absolute space-time coordinates are still arbitrary non-descriptive labels although invoking the distributed nature of this monster's subjectivity [Mary Shelley] I and Jack the Ripper may seem to have different spatial relationships with other objects of the universe, defining some co-ordinate system, a relative one, structural and not arbitrary so it would appear that we are different; but not really, because the way in which we supposedly differ is relational to other external objects, rather than involving some internal structure of me or Jack - we can say that I and Jack the Ripper are internally identical but not relationally identical - but then we would have to include these relations as a part of the

description of both me and Jack and if we do this we'd then have to include the rest of the universe and its relationship to me or Jack the Ripper - Leibniz kind of attempts this elsewhere in contrast to Spinoza, who in Ethics declares that the finite mode for Jonathan Kemp or Jack the Ripper would be when they're not in such a universe at all and divorced from context which without doing something like this, we really can't talk about individual objects within a universe in the first place

#### 10] thought experiment 2

Jonathan Kemp and Jack the Ripper are not identical structures when considered in context with all other objects, but if considered on their own, they have the same structure, and it is this structure that is one and not two (but this structure is really the only thing that can be called Jonathan Kemp or Jack the Ripper without bringing in the rest of the universe)

so if i say Jonathan Kemp and Jack the Ripper are the same, one, it must have all the relations formerly attributed to Jonathan Kemp and Jack the Ripper independently including a spatio-temporal relation between Jonathan Kemp and Jack which now becomes a spatio-temporal relationship of Jonathan Kemp/Jack with himself

whiff this is counter-intuitive its because our intuition is sound as in our world you never get two absolutely internally identical objects A + B, but it is logically consistent to describe a possible universe in which A + B exist as such, and from that, via PII it can be said that A + B are actually one -

this isn't our universe but one where Occams Razor is applied as Jonathan Kemp/Jack or Jonathan Kemp and Jack are equivalent, but the singular description is simpler and nothing gained by talking about both Jonathan Kemp and Jack, and even if we talk about Jonathan Kemp and Jack in context, including the relations with other things, there is still a structure shared by them and this structure is one thing, not two

#### 11] thought experiment 3

then there's a possible universe where there are nothing but two perfectly identical tapes running, so that there are no relations with other objects to confuse the issue -seems intuitive to some people that without these extraneous relations, the two tapes must have identical descriptions and yet really be two - the description of each tapes relationship to the other tape is identical, yet this relationship would not be a property of a single tape existing by itself, since there would be no other tape for it to have a spatial relationship with in the first place

but this does not mean that there are two tapes - a single object can have a relationship with itself, like Jonathan Kemp and Jack the Ripper, as an internal relationship, not external, so the universe with only two tapes could equally well be described as a single tape with an internal spatial relationship to itself, with Occams Razor again slicing in with the cut

extending the two-tape universe to include more than tapes - there are tapes with people living out their lives, each tape perfectly mirroring whatever happens on the other tape - the simplest possible description of such a universe would include only one tape not two. so what sense is there in saying there are two tapes? even if the people on tape 1 could see or interact somehow with those on tape 2, so long as the interaction is symmetrical, we can just as easily consider it to be a relation the tape has with itself, rather than with another identical tape. this makes it an internal property and not a relation at all

12] Fassbinder's essential work posits embeddings of simulations/overlap and ill-decision between realities and further embeddings of non-deterministic post-Turing machines simulating and spawning and continuing the processes of other simulated post-Turing machines

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